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The Vitality of the Common Law In Our Time
ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF*
As EDITORS OF A LEARNED LAW REVIEW yOU are scholars interested in the
theoretical aspects of jurisprudence. The law as a body of doctrines and prin-
ciples governing the rights and liabilities of members of society and their
relation to each other and to the state, is a science, not necessarily logical
and symmetrical, or even well rounded, but nevertheless a science. On the
other hand, enlightened application and practical administration of the law
is much more than a science; it becomes an art. Because of your devotion to
the law as a science, my remarks on this occasion will be directed to a few of
its theoretical phases.
I have taken as my topic for this discourse, "The Vitality of the Common
Law in our Time". At the outset of this discussion, it seems desirable to fix
a few bearings as starting points, even at the risk of recalling some matters
that are simple and well known. The common law of England, supple-
mented by equity, forms the basic core of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
It was brought to this continent by the English colonists. It grew and devel-
oped in a manner different from that of the other great system of Western
law, namely, Roman law, which in its more modern form has become known
as the civil law, in contra-distinction to the common law.
Common law has been molded over the centuries by judges, step by step,
growing from one specific case to another. As a controversy came before a
court for decision, the judge determined what should be the rule of law to
govern its disposition and applied that principle to the facts. Each decision
created a precedent for future cases. As new cases were brought before the
courts, varying in salient facts from those confronted in prior controversies,
the judges had the function of adjusting or formulating modifications or ad-
* Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
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vances on doctrines previously enunciated. A principle of law is derived
from the ruling on the facts of the case. It is not the judge's discussion that
constitutes the law. The principle to be deduced from the case is the con-
clusion distilled from the final disposition on the facts. Any exposition of the
views of the court outside of this orbit becomes dictum and may be interest-
ing and entitled to respect, but it is no part of the law.' The rules evolved by
this process become embodied in the law and are followed in subsequent
cases, on the principle known as stare decisis, which is one of the fundamental
bulwarks of the common law.
Thus the common law has been built up by progress from case to case.
The analytical process by which it has evolved in the course of centuries is a
triumph of inductive logic. I shall not enter upon a discussion of the long-
standing disagreement between the fundamentalists, who adhere to the view
that judges "find" the law, and the realists, who contend that judges "make"
law. As is often the case in differences of opinion, there is a modicum of truth
on each side. Lord Mansfield, in fashioning the law merchant, was actually
finding the law, for he ascertained the customs and the usages of the mer-
chants of the city of London of his day, and gave legal sanction to these prac-
tices by his decisions. Nevertheless, it is not to be doubted that more often, a
judge determines on the basis of former precedents, social needs, and a sense
of justice, in cases of first impression, what the governing rule of law should
be. A judge may make law by building on prior material and may at times
even modify it in the light of new requirements and changing conditions.
2
His function of formulating law is, however, limited in the sense that he may
not suddenly bring about far-reaching and drastic changes in basic theories,
or adopt a novel approach or a new fundamental alteration in rights and
liabilities. He proceeds gradually, one step at a time.
Mr. Justice Holmes expressed this thought very lucidly, when he said: 3
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A
common-law judge could not say I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of
historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court.
In this respect law formed by judges differs drastically from law enacted
by legislators. Judges proceed gradually, as actual cases are presented to
them. They build on precedents by following, applying, distinguishing,
1 See the discussion of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
398 (1821), emphasizing the distinction between actual decisions and dicta, and more recently
Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495, 506.
9 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICLAL PROCESS 45, 112, 116 (1921); THE GROWTH OF THE
LAw 73 (1924); 3 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 557 passim (1959).
8 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (dissenting opinion).
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modifying them or engrafting exceptions. On the other hand, legislators are
not restricted in this manner. They have the choice of either enacting de-
tailed modifications in existing law, or proceeding without regard to prior
legislation and making extensive changes, or even introducing new methods
and novel approaches. For example, the substitution of the workmen's com-
pensation system based on the principle of insurance and compensation for
injuries incurred in the course of employment irrespective of fault for the
common law doctrine of master and servant, under which the former was
liable only in case his negligence caused the servant's injuries, was an inno-
vation that could not have been brought about by judicial decisions. It re-
quired legislation to abandon and depart from earlier concepts and adopt
a new scheme. Another, perhaps less striking, illustration is the enactment
of the Federal Tort Claims Act 4 by which the United States waived its sov-
ereign immunity and with certain limited exceptions, submitted itself to
suit for torts committed by its employees in the course of employment, in
the same manner as a private employer.
Once a statute is enacted by the legislature, it is rigid. The rule prescribed
by it cannot be changed, except by subsequent action of the legislative body.
By contrast the common law has the virtue of flexibility and capacity for con-
tinuous adjustment to shifting conditions and changing needs. Judges have
it in their power by judicial decision in individual cases to make necessary
modifications as time progresses. This process never stops or ends. As Mr.
Justice Cardozo remarked in his inimitable picturesque style, "the inn that
shelters for the night is not the journey's end. The law, like the traveler,
must be ready for the morrow. It must have the principle of growth.'' 5
The law, whether it be judge-made or enacted by the legislature, must be
an expression of the popular will, in the sense that it must be suitable to ex-
isting conditions and responsive to the sentiments and demands of the peo-
ple. It was said by Mr. Justice Holmes that, "the first requirement of a sound
body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and de-
mands of the community, whether right or wrong."6 He also made the oft
reiterated observation that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. ' 7 Law must be in harmony with public sentiment. Otherwise,
as was remarked by the eminent English jurist Allen, "sovereign legislation
is sovereign only in name, and will soon cease to be even that." s
These views are not limited to votaries of the common law. They express
the nature and essence of law generally. The renowned continental jurist
'Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
5 CARDoZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 18 (1924).
e HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 41 (1881).
7Id. at 1.8 ALLzN, LAW IN THE MAKING 430 (7th ed. 1964).
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Savigny referred to "the spirit of a people living and working in common
in all individuals which gives birth to positive law."9
The law slowly and gradually, almost imperceptibly at times, adjusts itself
to the requirements caused by alterations in social and economic conditions
of life. It follows necessarily that the law changes only after new needs be-
come crystallized and, therefore, it must follow rather than lead. Holmes re-
marked that, "It cannot be helped, it is as it should be, that the law lags be-
hind the times."' 0 If, however, the law tarries too far to the rear of the prog-
ress of events, it does not adequately fulfill its true function. On the other
hand, the law departs from its purpose if it undertakes to march in advance
of public opinion. As social and economic conditions change and take a new
form, as the requirements of life present new needs and as public opinion
makes new demands, the law must follow. Leadership must be vested in
those who influence public opinion and those whose activities affect the social
and economic life of the people. There have, indeed, been occasions when
the law tried to proceed in advance of public opinion and in some of these
instances it has been confronted with difficulties for that very reason. A
graphic and vivid illustration is the ill-fated prohibition amendment. The
public did not want it and was not ready for it. It failed. There have been
times when the law has tried to overcome such obstacles and struggled
through a period of travail while waiting for public opinion to come abreast
of it. Difficulties were confronted, because the law stepped out of its true
function.
The basic purpose of law, whether it be judge-made or enacted
by the legislature, is to accord justice to everyone. Mankind strives to reach
this ideal. The limitations and fallibility of human nature, however, at times
render impossible the fulfillment and the complete attainment of this noble
goal and this lofty aim. The law is not an end in itself, but a means and an
instrument for achieving justice. Man has an innate passion to do what is
fair and just. The expression and fruit of these yearnings may be called nat-
ural law. Mr. Justice Cardozo said that, "The final cause of law is the wel-
fare of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its
existence."" To be sure, at various times and in different stages of history,
there may be disagreements as to how this ideal should be reached. Then
the judge or the legislator steps in.
Today law enacted by the legislature occupies a far greater portion of the
field of private rights and liabilities than was the case in the formative cen-
turies of the common law. We have already recalled that workmen's com-
9 1 SAVIGNY, A SYSTEM OF MODERN ROMAN LAW 12 (1867).
10 HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 294 (1920).
n CARDozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921).
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pensation has been removed by statute from the common law of master and
servant. The law of real property, derived originally from feudal tenures,
has been drastically modified from time to time by legislative codes. The law
of domestic relations has become largely statutory. The law regulating com-
mercial paper and its concomitants has been formulated into statutory form,
based very largely, however, on the law merchant. Other similar illustrations
may be cited. The fact remains that by far the larger part of the law govern-
ing private rights and liabilities still lies in the field of common law. For ex-
ample, the law of contracts, except as it affects commercial paper and sales;
the law of torts, with the exception of workmen's compensation, which was
carved out of it; and the doctrines and principles of equity, all remain in the
field of judicial decisions; and are, fortunately, in the same malleable state
capable of being adjusted in conformity to the changing requirements of
society as they ever were.
Shortly before the turn of the century, a prominent member of the District
of Columbia judiciary made the following observations: 12
The chief attribute of the common law has ever been its flexibility, its power
of expansion and adaptation to the changing needs and circumstances of a com-
plex civilization, advancing under the influences of learning, discovery and in-
vention. While sudden and radical changes in its rules should only be wrought
by legislative power and not by the courts, yet these should not adhere to the
applications of the principles made in other days under circumstances and sur-
roundings which may have completely changed, bearing the reason of the old
rule with them.
We are now brought to a more intensive and elaborate consideration of
the question to what extent the common law still maintains its attribute of
flexibility and its quality of adaptability to changing needs and circumstances
and, thereby, preserves its vigor and vitality. There has been a wholesome
tendency in numerous branches of the common law to ameliorate the harsh
results of some of its rigid rules, and to introduce, bit by bit, some humanitar-
ian qualities in situations where they appear requisite. The law is gradually
increasing its regard for the rights of individuals. The modern trend has
been in that direction, with but few exceptions here and there. This dispo-
sition has been more marked in the United States than in England, because
in this country the effect of precedents is less binding and controlling. With-
out any attempt at being exhaustive, a few glances at some recent advances
may be illuminating.
The law of contracts has become more solidly crystallized and exhibits per-
Shepherd, J. in Utermehle v. McGreal, I App. D.C. 359, 368-69 (1893), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688 (1897).
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haps less need for adjustment and change than some of the other branches
of the common law. It may be of interest, however, to observe that the doc-
trine of duress, both from the equitable and legal standpoint, as a means of
avoiding a contract, is in the process of being drastically modified. There has
been a departure in recent years from the old common law concept that du-
ress was restricted to the exertion of physical force against a person or prop-
erty. Pressure of other types is now recognized as constituting duress. The
term "economic duress" has come into being.13
Statutes have very largely superseded the common law in the field of real
property. Yet certain aspects of reciprocal rights and liabilities of a vendor
and vendee of land and buildings and of an owner and an invitee, are grad-
ually being modified. Because of its origin and history, the common law ac-
corded to the owner of real property a special status and surrounded him
with immunities that are obsolete, or at least obsolescent, in modern times.
Orginally he was not liable for damages caused by any defect in the construc-
tion of a building owned by him, after he had parted with title to the prop-
erty. There are glimmerings of a change flashing before our own eyes. Some
authorities now indicate that a builder may be liable for damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained as a result of defective construction caused by his
negligence. The right to recover damages in such an instance has been ap-
plied in favor of both a vendee and an invitee. 14 In several jurisdictions, it
has been held that a vendor of real property is liable to a vendee and to an
invitee for injuries caused by a concealed or latent defect in the freehold,
the existence of which the vendor had failed to disclose. 15
The law regulating domestic relations has become largely statutory.
Some aspects of it, however, still remain in the field of judicial decisions. A
striking example is found in the principles governing custody of minor chil-
ren. The emphasis has shifted from the rights of parents to the rights of the
child. Instead of determining, as used to be the case, who has the legal right
to the custody of a child under particular circumstances, the test has grad-
ually become, what is best for the welfare of the child, and the problem is
resolved accordingly.' 6 In other words, it is the child, not the parent, who
I See Walsh-Healy Act, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1964), for legislation de-
signed to enforce economic guidelines in government contracting; for judicial recognition of
the term "economic duress," see Hazelhurst Oil Mill & Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 70 Ct.
Cl. 334, 42 F.2d 331 (1980) and Alloy Products Corp. v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 376, 302
F.2d 528 (1962).
14 Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d
53 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
15 Kilmer v. White, 254 N.Y. 64, 70, 171 N.E. 908, 910 (1930); Pharm v. Lituchy, 283 N.Y.
130, 27 N.E.2d 811 (1940); McCabe v. Cohen, 294 N.Y. 522, 63 N.E.2d 88 (1945); Palmore v.
Morris, 182 Pa. 82, 90, 37 Atd. 995, 999 (1897) (dictum); United States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681,
684 (5th Cir. 1953).
"1 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Bartlett, 221 F.2d 508, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d
153 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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has rights. In referring to this subject we are of course departing from the
realm of the common law and entering the province of equity. Nevertheless,
this topic is pertinent to the present discussion an an induction of the
broadminded and humanitarian direction in which the law generally is
travelling.
It is in the domain of the law of torts that we find the most potent and vig-
orous ferment that has been going on for some time and is still in progress.
It seems appropriate to devote some attention to a few of the phases of this
branch of the law, in which this development appears. We shall deal first
with some aspects of the law of negligence. There the modern tendency is
strongly in the direction of protecting and extending the rights of an in-
dividual who has been injured as the result of the negligence of another per-
son.
For many years, a charity, such as a charitable hospital, was immune from
responding to suits for damages for personal injuries caused by the negli-
gence of its employees. The underlying theory was that the assets of a charity
constituted a trust fund for the fulfillment of the purposes for which it was
created and, therefore, should not be diverted to some other use. The diffi-
culty with this doctrine was that it left an injured party unprotected and
without redress. Some years ago various jurisdictions in this country began
to abandon the old rule and to subject charitable organizations, such as hos-
pitals, to liability to suit in tort. Among the jurisdictions that were leaders
in this movement was the District of Columbia. 17 Others have followed this
lead, one by one, and more are being added to the list almost annually. Only
recently Illinois joined the procession. 18
Among the characteristic traits of the American people, is a special fond-
ness for children and a thoughtful and benevolent regard for their welfare.
This commendable attitude is reflected in the doctrine that has been de-
veloped in this country, known as the "doctrine of attractive nuisance". It
had its origin about ninety years ago in a decision of the Supreme Court.19
Because of the fortuitous circumstances that the facts in the progenitor of
this doctrine comprised a railroad turntable, this decision and the group that
have followed it, have become known as the "turntable cases". The doctrine
grew and spread gradually with the result that it is now recognized in a ma-
jority of the states.
20
Changing conditions of life by ineluctable logic lead gradually to corre-
", President & Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. App. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965).
" Sioux City & Pacific R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
2A summary of the history of the doctrine is found in McGettigan v. National Bank, 199
F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 320 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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sponding modifications in the law of negligence. The flight from the farm to
the city and the vast growth of urban population, which made man less self-
sufficient and more dependent on organized society for his daily necessities;
the stupendous growth in the number of automobiles plying the streets and
highways; the concentration of manufacture and distribution of commodi-
ties of various types, from automobiles to food packages under brand names
on a nation-wide basis, all lead to changes in the pace and mode of life and
require significant and vital readjustments in many rules of law in the field
of negligence. The common law has closely followed in the wake of these
developments.
The rigid common law rule that there can be no contribution between
joint tortfeasors has become largely outmoded and unsuitable to contempo-
rary life. Too many actions for damages for personal injuries involve more
than one culpable defendant. To place the entire financial burden on one
party at the choice of the injured plantiff is markedly unfair and inequitable.
The situation is graphically silhouetted by numerous automobile collision
cases in which two or more drivers are partly at fault. In many jurisdictions
the old common law rule has been abandoned and contribution between
joint tortfeasors is now permitted in various forms.21 In some, the modifica-
tion was attained by judicial decisions as a change in the common law, thus
vindicating its vitality. For example, the District of Columbia has been in
the forefront of jurisdictions that have introduced contribution between
joint tortfeasors as a modification of the common law, rather than by legis-
lative action.2
2
The doctrine which entirely bars a plaintiff in a negligence action from
recovery if he is guilty of contributory negligence, has given rise to many
problems, especially with the gigantic growth of motor vehicle traffic. It was
obviously necessary to alleviate the rigor of the rule that precluded any plain-
tiff guilty of contributory negligence from recovering damages, irrespective
of the degree of the defendant's negligence. Otherwise a person who was
guilty of contributory negligence would be treated practically as an outlaw
and could be run down or struck by a motor vehicle with impunity, no mat-
ter how negligent its driver might have been. It was manifest that such an
outcome was abhorent and intolerable and some amelioration of the law was
indispensable. The result was the development of the beneficent doctrine,
known by the picturesque appellation of the doctrine of "the last clear
chance." This doctrine has had a dynamic growth in recent years and is a
vital part of the law of negligence today.
2
3
2 See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-627 (1950); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 412.030 (1963).
George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Knell v. Felt-
man, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Davis v. Broad Street Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d
355 (1950); Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W. 766 (1931).
I See a discussion of the rule in Fleming v. Ayoud, 206 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1962).
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The most important and far-reaching series of changes in the law of negli-
gence is being brought about at this very time as the result of the develop-
ment of modern methods of centralized manufacture and large scale distribu-
tion of articles in every day use, of innumerable miscellaneous types
from food packages to automobiles. The inception of this departure is to
be found in an opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo, written for the New York
Court of Appeals in the celebrated case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co. 24
It will be recalled that in that case the manufacturer of an automobile was
held liable for damages for personal injuries sustained by an ultimate con-
sumer as a result of a defect in the mechanism of the vehicle. The court enun-
ciated the doctrine that a person who places a dangerous instrumentality
into circulation is liable to anyone who sustains any injury as a result of any
defect in its construction or assembly. Innumerable ramifications were grad-
ually generated and radiated from this decision. A lack of privity of con-
tract was at first often a stumbling block. Technical distinctions were occa-
sionally drawn in the early stages of the new development based on a differ-
entiation between a cause of action for breach of warranty and one sounding
in tort for negligence.
The principle of the MacPherson case was first extended to food and bev-
erages generally sold by a storekeeper in packages or containers in which he
receives it at wholesale from the original producer or middleman. The doc-
trine was also applied to medicines, cosmetics and other similar articles. It
is now spreading to articles of merchandise generally, on the theory that a
manufacturer, producer or distributor impliedly warrants the fitness of the
product for the purpose for which it was intended. The case is practically
one of absolute liability.
Most jurisdictions are gradually abandoning the requirement of privity
of contract in such cases, since ordinarily the injured party is an ultimate
consumer who has had no direct relation with the producer, manufacturer
or distributor, but who purchased the commodity at a retail establishment.
The original distinction between an action based on breach of warranty
and one founded on negligence is becoming obliterated. This far-reaching
transformation of an important aspect of the common law is taking place
in our own day. It is necessitated by changing conditions of life. Yet we are
so close to it that at times we are unable to observe it in its proper perspective.
Still another important step taken by the common law in recent years is
the creation and recognition of a new right, which orginally was not known
to the common law, namely, the right of privacy. 25 It has been at times
21217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
25Judicial recognition of a right to privacy was first advocated in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren
and Louis Brandeis, 4 HAnv. L. Rav. 193 (1890). The right, found either in common law or
statute, has been passed upon by almost all of the states. New York, Oklahoma, Utah and
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pointedly described as the right to be let alone. Specifically, as recognized
by law, it is a right not to have one's photograph disseminated and a right
not to have articles published concerning one's private life and comprising
events that are not in the public domain. It may be interesting to note that
an early recognition of the existence of such a right is found in a decision
rendered about forty years ago by a trial court of the District of Columbia.26
It was first authoritatively enunciated in 1905 by the Supreme Court of
Georgia.27 New Jersey followed three years later, and other jurisdictions have
gradually adopted the new doctrine. It may be said to have become a part
of the common law of this country.
28
Strangely enough, while generally the trend of development in the law
of torts has been in the direction of extending and enlarging the privileges
of private individuals and safeguarding and protecting them against inva-
sion by others, the exact opposite has taken place recently in connection with
the law of libel. These are developments of the past few years. The area of
privileged communications has been expanded to include public utterances
of policy-making federal officials when making statements concerning the
activities of agencies over which they preside.29 This development not only
constitutes a modification of the law of libel, but is an encroachment on the
basic philosophy of Anglo-American jurisprudence in respect to the respon-
sibilities and liabilities of public officers. It has been the rule from time im-
memorial that a public officer is just as liable as anyone else for damages
for torts committed by him, even if this occurs in the course of the perform-
ance of official duties. In this respect the doctrine of the common law has been
drastically different from that prevailing in civil law countries.
Still another very recent modification in the law of libel is the introduc-
tion of a new principle that a high-ranking public official who is in the pub-
lic eye may be criticized with impunity, even to the extent of making false
statements of fact concerning him and that he may not maintain an action
for libel because of such attacks, unless he can prove actual malice.3 0 This
decision is based on the right of freedom of speech guaranteed by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In that respect it re-
lates to constitutional law, but its consequence is also to modify the law of
Virginia have enacted such statutes. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 469 (1965), the
Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy as constitutionally guaranteed.
Peed v. Washington Times Co., 55 Wash. Law Rptr. 182 (1927).
122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
s For a brief summary of the history of the doctrine, see Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948).
,"Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). Only four
members of the Court concurred in the opinions of the Court, and there may be a question
whether they actually represent the law.
" New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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libel to that extent. It may be remarked that on this point the law of the
United States and the law of England part company. England lays much
greater emphasis and attaches much more weight to the law of libel than is
done in this country. 31 For example, while since World War II jury trials in
civil actions have been practically abolished in England, an exception is
made for cases of libel and slander, in which trial by jury still prevails. The
explanation given for this seeming anomaly is that while most civil actions
involve merely money, actions for defamation relate to honor and reputa-
tion and, therefore, are on a higher plane.
The vitality of the common law manifestly has not been impaired. As ever
it continues to maintain its chief attributes, its flexibility and its capacity for
expansion and adaptation to the changing needs and altered circumstances
and surroundings of a complex civilization. Its vigor as a living force con-
tinues to permeate it.
It is unabated. The common law has not become petrified. It does not
stand still. It continues in a state of flux. Its ever present fluidity enables it
to meet and adjust itself to shifting conditions and new demands. It is a lei-
surely stream that has not ceased to flow gently and continuously in its
proper channel, at times gradually and imperceptibly eroding a bit of the
soil from one of its banks, and at other times getting rid of and depositing
a bit of silt. Repose is not its destiny.
11 For a discussion of the English law of libel and slander, see Wade, Defamation, 66 L. Q.
REv. 348 (1950).
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